Transport Nexus

The nexus between transportation and land use.

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The latest example proving the nexus between transportation and land use…

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On August 8, 2013

In Commuter Rail, Infrastructure, Transit-Oriented Development

Crossrail Line 1. Source: David Arthur

…Comes to us from London, my brief one-time home. Courtesy of Crossrail, the major commuter rail project linking East and West London together more seamlessly with dramatic expected time savings. While Crossrail is not scheduled to open until 2018, the benefits that the Crossrail project is promising to deliver have already impacted the local real estate market.

Goldman’s employees would be able to reach Heathrow Airport from Farringdon in about 30 minutes on Crossrail, compared with more than an hour on the London Underground. Travel to east London’s Canary Wharf financial district will take 9 minutes, from about 25 minutes today. The City Thameslink system already takes passengers to Gatwick Airport to the south and Luton Airport north of the City.

“That’s what makes this the crossroads of central London,” Rees, the City’s top planner, said in an interview.

Crossrail will build 9 new stations in Central London, provide up to 24 trains per hour (1 train every two and a half minutes!) carrying 1,500 riders each. It will increase the rail network capacity while simultaneously reducing travel times by up to 50%. Transit-oriented development is already taking place, capitalizing on new areas of Central London becoming more accessible. More than 3 million square feet of residential and retail development are anticipated to take place, just over the stations sites.

This is the benefit that transportation infrastructure can bear on a place. It is smart development – taking advantage of the high-capacity, incredibly expensive infrastructure by also providing high density land uses to leverage that infrastructure investment.

See video.

 

The Suburban Experiment, Explained

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On May 6, 2013

In Infrastructure, The Suburban Experiment

I have been an enthusiastic adopter of the term “suburban experiment” after having following the magnificent work that Strong Towns does up in Minnesota. But it came to my attention that I have not fully explained it and applied it here in Chicago.  So, I’d like to take a step back. Of course, since I did not invent the term, it’s best to direct you to the primary source. Chuck Marohn’s seminal articles on the suburban experiment note that:

“our post-World War II pattern of development — operates like a classic Ponzi scheme, with ever-increasing rates of growth necessary to sustain long-term liabilities.”

Meaning essentially that this form of development cannot fiscally sustain itself over more than one life cycle without  more growth to pay off previous liabilities.  Essentially, all of the infrastructure that supports the inefficient development pattern that is modern suburbia, the huge investment in roads and utilities to support sparsely dense areas, does not make economic sense after one life cycle.

We’re already seeing this today.

You know we can’t support our towns and cities when roads turn to gravel, when bridges collapse, streetlights get turned off and park districts, schools and municipal budgets are slashed despite ever rising taxes. It means that we’re not allocating our resources efficiently, that maybe the great wealth this country has had has been spent towards a pattern of development that just cannot sustain itself.

 

 

 

Transit Disinvestment

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On January 14, 2013

In Infrastructure

A CTA train emerges from the north portal of t...

Rising up or falling down?  (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In my hometown, Chicago, the CTA raised fares today.  Lots of people are upset, and for good reason. In many cases it’s easy to blame the low hanging fruit – mismanagement, corruption, government waste, high salaries and benefits, etc. Often, the 800 pound gorilla in the room is none of these things. Raising fares is a rational response to a systemic problem in this country – the poor state of good repair as it’s called in the business, or the lack of well maintained infrastructure. It is a lack of a commitment nationwide to maintaining our infrastructure – and the problem is that we’re overbuilt – causing these state of good repair issues. And I don’t mean that we’re overbuilt on transit – it’s the roads, our development pattern and our suburban experiment that is bankrupting us.

CTA, like transit properties nationwide and like Metra here in Chicago, is raising fares in part due to declining federal and state support for capital expenditures and a poor economy  that has devastated the operating side of the budget. This is happening all across the country. Therefore, it’s easy to see how transit gets into a situation, a cycle of slow, but perpetual disinvestment on the capital side, not out of poor management, but rather choices in which one must choose the least bad option. Then, the economy goes down, bringing down sales taxes – the principal operating finance mechanism – and now transit is unable to make payroll. This is referred to as the transit “death spiral.”

Transit is in a pickle. In the vast majority of cities it carries just a fraction of the overall work commute. In the Chicago metropolitan statistical area, that number is 11.5%. We’re in fourth place behind New York (31.1%), Washington D.C. (14.8%), and San Francisco (14.4%). It’s difficult to marshall the political forces needed to support transit locally and nationally when only 11.5% of the region’s work trips are made by transit. These numbers are so low precisely because of the built environment we have created. And until the fundamentals of that growth mechanism known as our suburban experiment change, I think the cycle of disinvestment in our infrastructure is likely to continue.

Olympics Games: Negative Externalities

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On May 9, 2012

In Infrastructure, Olympics

London 2012 banner at The Monument.

London 2012 banner at The Monument. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

So far I’ve spent a great deal of effort highlighting the Olympic Games as catalyst for urban redevelopment, transportation and infrastructure investments, and so on. I would be remiss, of course, if I did not point out the negative externalities that the Games can cause. Note that a negative externality is an action of a product on consumers that imposes a negative side effect on a third-party. Such examples may include pollution, climate change, and tragedy of the commons situations.

Negative externalities, in the context of the Olympic Games, can generally impact a host city in three distinct ways: financial, structural and image (Source: Preuss). When discussing finance, I’d be remiss not to mention the 1976 Montreal Olympics, a financial boondoggle that took 30 years to pay off. Montreal is the case in point that when the Olympic profits are smaller than debts, often the host city is making up the difference, financially.

Structural externalities include hard and soft factors. The hard factors are the physical infrastructure developed for the Games, including transportation, telecommunications, tourism, and athletic stadiums. When the cost of developing this infrastructure is too high, such as in Montreal, the host city suffers. The financial liabilities that Montreal faced (and Munich to a lesser extent) was from high investments in transport and sporting infrastructure. In other cases, such as Athens, the sporting infrastructure developed for the Games was vastly underutilized due to lack of demand after the Games.

The image of a host city can also suffer as a result of the Games. While rare, Atlanta has been regarded in many ways to have negatively suffered, largely in the fact that its traffic situation was, and is, horrific. Additionally, security came to be a major issue that damaged Atlanta in the aftermath of the Games.

The above cases represent negative externalities that can happen after the Games have passed. In the case of London, however, one can argue that negative externalities from the Games have already started to appear.

One such negative externality is the scarcity of land in London, generally, and in the London Borough of Newham, specifically, where rising rents due to lack of supply and the significant infrastructure and development investments in and around Olympic Park. In this case the shared resource is land and its lack of availability is causing the Borough to consider new ways of ameliorating the problem: by exporting the poor. It has been argued by some  scholars of the Olympics, that certain groups, such as the underclass, the homeless and low-cost rental groups, can be made worse off as a result of an Olympic Games. Its been contended that Olympic legacy benefits accrue to the already privileged sectors of the population’ while the disadvantaged bear a disproportionate share of the burden.

After the Games, keep a close watch on whether the sporting infrastructure is used and whether various transport infrastructure pays off. In a future post, we’ll highlight what some of those investments are.

 

 

 

Olympic Games and Transport Infrastructure: An Analysis

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On April 19, 2012

In Olympics, Urban Planning

Olympic Games construction site A birds eye vi...

This is the last in a four-part series on the Olympic Games as a catalyst for urban, and specifically transportation, development. In Part I, we explored  the background of how the Games are administered at the local level. Part II examines the growth of the Olympic Games and how it became a catalyst for general urban development. And Part III examined transport infrastructure in relation to the Games, with a closer look at London’s preparation for the upcoming 2012 Summer Olympics. In this last post on the Olympic Games, we’ll analyze what this all means for the Olympic Games and for the host cities themselves.

Analysis

A London Underground train decorated to promot...

A London Underground train decorated to promote London's Olympic bid. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Transportation infrastructure has become essential component of successfully hosting a mega event such as the Olympic Games. Due to the large volume of spectators and athletes, logistics problems become complex as organizers seek to make the Games as efficient as possible in an urban transport network that is often inefficient. Because of each city’s unique history and urban form, the impacts of the Games on transport development differ.

Additionally, it becomes clear that when examining previous Olympic Games over the last few decades, many of the host cities have tried to choose sites which were underutilized or brownfield sites. Often these sites are the only large sites within the central city that is suitable for Olympic venues. Additional incentives for this seem to be a regeneration of central city areas like we have seen at Homebush Bay in Sydney, Helliniko Airport in Athens, and Stratford in London. In all cases, some transportation infrastructure may have been in place, yet it was underutilized or inefficiently serving the site.

In Sydney, host of the 2000 Summer Olympics, the Games were a significant catalyst for urban infrastructure development around the region. Beside the direct investments made for the Games, the indirect investments prior to or after the Olympic Games were expedited. These improvements included better transport connectivity and a major capacity expansion scheme to its airport, Kingsford Smith International, as well as capacity improvements at its main rail hub, Central Station. All together, direct investment in transport infrastructure as a result of the Olympic Games was A$370 million ($384 million), while indirect investment was approximately A$3 billion ($3.1 billion).

Athens, host of the 2004 Summer Olympics,  had transport issues that were significantly different from Sydney’s. Athens is an ancient city with a dense urban form. It also did not have much of the tertiary structure that is necessary to handle the increased demands of an Olympic Games. Due to the city’s urban form and a lack of large parcels of available public land, Athens had to spread out its Olympic venues across the Attica Plain. This was problematic due to the notorious traffic congestion facing Athens and the little public transport infrastructure within the city. Thus, by agreeing to host the Olympic Games, Athens embarked on a scale of transport investment that had not been seen since Tokyo in 1964. The direct and indirect investments in transport infrastructure included a new international airport, two metro lines, a tram system, and a suburban railway. All of these infrastructure improvements were built with the goal of making transport more efficient during the Olympic Games. In total, direct investment as a result of the Olympic Games in transport infrastructure was over 2.86 billion euro ($4.5 billion).

London’s model for urban development was similar to Sydney. It has an area ripe for regeneration at Stratford. London also has transport connections near the site of the Olympic Park but needed significant investment in public transportation infrastructure to make the site accessible. The Olympic Village is also adjacent to the Olympic Park like in Sydney. However, the similarities between the two cities end here.

London has a much more complex set of existing transport infrastructure in place. The key for London is to arrange and maximize the efficiencies of the transport infrastructure to serve the Games and the regeneration afterward. For London is unique in the case studies to be simultaneously regenerating the area around the Olympic Park in Stratford.

It is difficult to estimate how much the London Olympic Games will eventually cost. Cost overruns have already plagued the Games and are further anticipated. Given what is now reported, however, direct investment by the Her Majesty’s Government in transport is anticipated to be approximately £900m ($1.8 billion). Indirect investments in transport, particularly at Stratford International and other public transport services, both public and private, are estimated at £1bn ($2 billion) annually from 2007 through 2012.

Legacy

A legacy of the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea. The Olympic Bridge over the River Han.Source: yarra 64 @ Wikimedia Commons.

Over the past several decades, almost all Olympic host cities have used the Games as a catalyst for massive urban regeneration. The legacy of hosting the Games includes physical and economic effects that are left following the Games that would otherwise not have occurred without the Games.

Structural change to the host city’s urban infrastructure can provide the host city with a once in a lifetime opportunity for massive urban development. The improvement in transport infrastructure and efficiency makes the city more efficient and competitive, drawing industry, income, and jobs to the Olympic host city. It can spur regeneration like it has in London (5,000 homes and a town center). Or it can open up new areas for development (new international airport in Athens). Either way, the trend is toward larger and more significant investment in infrastructure, using the Olympic Games as a catalyst toward infrastructure investment and regeneration.

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